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AN EVALUATION OF TRANSFORMING THE OBLIGATION PERIOD 





 Combating negative public perceptions about wasteful, 
end-of-year spending is not a battle the Department of 
Defense (DOD) should have to fight.  DOD’s best intentions 
are to be good custodians of taxpayers’ dollars, but old 
archaic policies hamper its ability to efficiently obligate 
current year funding.  This project report will provide 
necessary background, analyze previous O&M obligation 
rates, discuss the advantages and disadvantages of 
extending the obligation period for one-year appropriations 
from one to two years and make recommendations based on the 
conclusions drawn from our data analysis.  The conclusions 
drawn from our report will reveal the overwhelming benefits 
DOD would achieve from changing current policy and how the 
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I. ONE-YEAR APPROPRIATION EXTENSION PROPOSAL 
EVALUATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. Specific Issues and Questions this Research will 
Address 
The purpose of this paper is to determine budgetary 
advantages and disadvantages of extending the obligation 
period of one-year appropriations, specifically Operations 
and Maintenance (O&M), to two years (24 months).  We will 
discuss how changing the obligation period would reduce 
suspected end-of-fiscal-year spending waste.  In addition, 
we will discuss how perceived wasteful spending is directly 
linked to inefficient use of the time of accountants, 
budget analysts and comptrollers. 
2. Focus: DOD Operation and Maintenance 
Appropriations 
As Mark Kozar stated, “Critics of the DOD claim that 
appropriated funds are wasted by DOD managers when they 
rush to obligate all available funds before the end of the 
year” (Kozar, 1993, page 132-133).  The Navy and DOD have 
dealt with this perception over the course of many years 
and especially during wartime.  The military environment is 
anything but routine, and just as the DOD is currently 
dealing with the war on terrorism, every comptroller and 
Supply Officer is independently preparing for the next 
contingency.  This situation is aggravated by DOD’s 
involvement in ongoing missions.  In other words, financial 
personnel are scrutinizing every obligation during the 
first three quarters and most of the fourth quarter of the 
fiscal year to ensure the organization stays under its 
budget constraints.  During the fourth quarter, additional 
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funds and/or funds that were previously held in reserve for 
contingencies must be spent in full prior to the end of the 
fiscal year when the obligation period lapses.   
To illustrate this point, Mark Kozar’s (Kozar, 1993, 
page 132-133) data is used to compute the percentage change 
of obligation spending in the months of August to September 
(from 1977 – 1990).  An increase of 54.15% is noted.1  
Thereby, when applying this percentage increase to the 
Fiscal Year 2005 Budget Authority (http://www.dod.mil 
/comptroller/defbudget/fy2005/fy2005summary_tables_part1.pd
f) of $141 billion available to DOD’s Operations and 
Maintenance appropriation; we compute an increase of $5.26 
billion2 was obligated in September.   
Although this spending is potentially on lower 
priority items, it is physically impossible to determine 
exactly how much of the spending would be allocated to 
lower priority items.  Past experience in dealing with 
military budgets and interviews conducted with eight 
different military officers tell us that a significant 
percentage is not necessarily wasted, but obligated toward 
requirements that may not be the highest priority.          
A thesis written by Miller gives credence to the 
problem of appropriated funds being obligated on waste and 
lower priority items and illustrates a bigger problem that 
there in no financial incentive for a Commander to be cost 
effective.  He states that, “Commanders must take painful 
steps to achieve efficiencies in day to day operations.  
                     
1
 10.616% - 6.887%)/6.887 = 54.15% increase in obligations  
2
 $141 billion x (10.616% - 6.887%) = $5.26 billion increase in 
obligations 
 3
Even when they are inclined to search for extra 
efficiencies to return to the enterprise, Commanders have 
little financial incentive to find them because those who 
save money generally do not benefit from the savings.  The 
Department of the Navy (DON) executes based on its annual 
budget.  Failure to spend one’s entire annual budget 
reduces the chance of maintaining that budget in future 
years.  As a result, when budgets have not been spent in 
full (i.e., savings have been identified), then a nagging 
question is raised:  does your organization need all of its 
funds? (Hale, 2002)  Consequently, budgets are cut.  
Therefore, there is no fiscal incentive to achieve savings 
in the interest of the enterprise.”  (Miller, 2005, page 
75-76). 
Currently, a large part of the problem with O&M 
obligation develops during contingency spending.  Recently 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom every activity was required 
to provide monthly itemized listings of all O&M funds 
obligated towards the war effort.  The Type Commanders then 
reimbursed each activity the incurred costs when 
supplemental appropriations were received as a result of 
Congressional action.   
It appears now when DOD executes a war it is done so 
on credit with a promise from the President and Congress to 
repay them for incurred expenses via a supplemental 
appropriation.  In the meantime, DOD uses existing O&M 
funding to fund the war effort.  In time, large sums of O&M 
funds are reprogrammed within DOD to pay for the war 
effort, and through the use of detailed data collection, 
DOD provides Congress an itemized bill for the cost of the 
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war.  Congress pays the bill with a supplemental 
appropriation that repays DOD the O&M funds that were 
reprogrammed to pay for the war. 
The supplemental funds are current-year as well as 
single-year funds.  Therefore, DOD could potentially 
receive a significant amount of reimbursed O&M funding and 
have less than a quarter of a year to obligate it.  These 
problems continue to exist during ongoing war efforts; in 
addition, DOD faces a similar situation in normal, peace-
time operations, but to a much lesser degree. 
Nevertheless, DOD faces the use or lose it predicament 
because it is given additional tasks every year…such as 
hurricane relief and tsunami relief plus the Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT) etc.  “For example, from 1990-1997, U.S. 
Naval forces participated in 50 major disaster missions.  
The duration of 12 of these operations lasted more than 2 
years.  Refugee support missions averaged over 3.6 
annually, peaking at eight concurrent operations in 1994.  
From 1990 to 1993, 17 natural disaster missions were 
carried out.  Between 1993 and 1997, 15 peacekeeping 
missions were undertaken.  During the 1990’s, the Navy 
evacuated embassy personnel from Liberia, Somalia, and 
Zaire; assisted refugees form Iraq, Cuba, China, Panama, 
and Rwanda; helped fight disease in Venezuela, helped 
people recover from storms in Antigua, the Philippines, 
Guam, Bangladesh, and the Bahamas; provided earthquake 
relief in the Philippines and Guam; aided the drought-
stricken in Micronesia and Somalia; coped with volcanic 
eruptions in the Philippines and Italy; and was involved 
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with peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, Somalia, Liberia, 
Ecuador, and Haiti.” (Jones and McCaffery, 2004, page 182)   
This unpredictable effect on funding significantly 
impacts the financial position of every branch of the DOD.  
Large sums of expiring funds lead to timely execution 
problems and are the underlying issue that causes 
perceived, wasteful end-of-year spending or spending that 
is linked to lower priority items. 
3. What are the Budgetary Dimensions of the Problem? 
The budgetary dimensions of this problem have far-
reaching implications with potential cost savings for the 
Department of Defense.  These savings are not necessarily 
due to any reduced, end-of-year wasteful spending taking 
place, but mostly through the more efficient use of 
existing resources if the surge of funding could be 
obligated over a longer period of time. 
To our knowledge and through our ongoing research, no 
programmed or budgeted funds have been applied towards the 
study of budgetary advantages and disadvantages of 
extending the obligation period of one-year appropriations.  
However, our research has revealed not only an interest in 
such a proposal, but on several occasions, the subject has 
been briefly discussed by various comptrollers we have 
talked with.  For example, an interview with the Commander 
Naval Surface Atlantic (CNSL) Fleet comptroller revealed a 
recent board discussion which questioned why O&M money was 
only available for 12 months.  Retired Navy Captain, John 
Mutty, now Professor at Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), 
and the Commander, Naval Surface Force Atlantic (CNSL) 
Comptroller both stated that the Secretary of Defense, 
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Donald Rumsfeld, recently testified before Congress about 
the potential savings of extending one-year appropriations 
to two years.  Professor Larry Jones from Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) provided over 40 emails from 
various financial managers from around the world who 
briefly discussed this proposal and knew of no research 
ever conducted on this topic. 
Our belief is that there are efficiencies to be gained 
and that DOD must challenge the paradigm.  Do we have one-
year appropriations simply because we have always had one-
year appropriations?  One identifiable objection to 
extending one-year appropriations to two years is the loss 
of power and influence by Congress and the idea that it 
would only solve the problem for one-year.  Although no 
solution can fully resolve these issues, a well-crafted 
proposal with effective, minimum-requirement objectives 
could significantly improve the current situation. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
How does DOD receive its current appropriations? 
http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/97-684.pdf  
The United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 9 
states, “No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in 
consequence of appropriations made by law.”  The following 
paragraphs abbreviate the steps that Congress must perform 
prior to the President signing the appropriation bill into 
law and thus providing DOD budget authority3. 
There are twenty budget functions in the federal 
budget.  All of the budget functions are classified as 
discretionary or mandatory spending. Thirteen different 
appropriations make up the discretionary spending bills 
which causes much of the tension in the Congress.  These 
thirteen different appropriations are presently equal to 
about one third of the federal budget.  Mandatory spending 
makes up the remaining two-thirds of the budget and are 
authorized by permanent laws. 
To start the process, the President sends his budget 
to Congress for the upcoming fiscal year on the first 
Monday in February.  This is required by law.  The DOD 
                     
3
 Budget Authority:  Authority provided by law to enter into 
financial obligations that will result in immediate or future outlays 
involving federal government funds.  Budget authority includes the 
credit subsidy cost for direct loan and loan guarantee programs, but 
does not include authority to insure or guarantee the repayment of 
indebtedness incurred by another person or government.  The basic forms 
include (1) appropriations, (2) borrowing authority, (3) contract 
authority, and (4) authority to obligate and expend offsetting receipts 
and collections.  Budget authority may be classified by its duration 
(1-year, multiple-year, or no-year), by the timing of the legislation 
providing the authority (current or permanent), by the manner of 
determining the amount available (definite or indefinite), or by its 
availability for new obligations. (GAO, 1993, page 21)  
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budget is included in his submission, but is only a portion 
of the federal budget and one of twenty budget functions.  
The President recommends spending levels in the form of 
budget authority, which is legal authority to make 
obligations. 
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) usually has 
prior knowledge of the budget by this time and analyzes it 
for future economic impact analysis.  Congress is 
interested in many issues, but among them is the forecast 
of the long-term budget deficit or surplus.    
http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/97-684.pdf  
In March, the budget goes to the House Budget 
Committee and Senate Budget Committee.  Their focus is to 
lay guidelines for the budget process, revenue, budget 
authority, surplus or deficit amounts and levels of public 
debt (Candreva et al, 2004).  This is known as the Budget 
Resolution and is a concurrent congressional resolution 
between the House and Senate.  April 15 is the deadline but 
it is rarely assembled in time, and if it is not completed, 
the prior year budget resolution is still in effect.  
Nevertheless, when this is completed, it is not signed by 
the President, nor is it law.  It does not provide Budget 
Authority and is meant only as a guide for Congress, and in 
some ways it can be viewed as a formal response to the 
President’s Budget. 
Also starting in February, the Congress is tackling 
the Defense Authorization Act too.  The House and Senate 
Armed Services Committee holds committee and subcommittee 
hearings so that programs have the authority to exist.  If  
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passed, it will be signed into law by the President.  
However, the authorization bill does not provide budget 
authority. 
Like the Budget and Authorization Bill, the House 
Appropriations Committee and Senate Appropriations 
Committee start hearings for the Defense Appropriations 
Bill in February.  As stated earlier, there are 13 
different appropriation bills that are signed into law, and 
all budget functions stem from these 13 different 
appropriations.  “Appropriations provide the budget 
authority so we may incur obligations and expenditures.  
Without an appropriations act or Continuing Resolution 
Authority, we do not have budget authority.  Upon 
completion of approval by both committees and both Houses 
of the Congress, the bills are forwarded to the President 
for his signature or veto.”  (Candreva et al, 2002, page 9)  
When an appropriation is passed, the Treasury issues a 
warrant for the amount of funds to be spent during the year 
and OMB apportions this amount to DOD.  The Secretary of 
Defense uses allotments to delegate to the different 
components the authority to incur a specific amount of 
obligations.  Following the allotments and allocations, 
obligations can be incurred (e.g. a contract let), and 
outlays can be paid when work or services are completed or 
equipment is delivered. 
A. STAKEHOLDERS WHO ARE AFFECTED BY THE PROBLEM 
Who has standing?  Since O&M funds are the largest 
single appropriation for the military (as indicated in 
Figure 1), the stakeholders are varied and quite large 
because it involves every military organization funded with 
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O&M appropriations.  However, the ultimate stakeholder is 
the taxpayer and they would benefit from more efficient use 
of O&M funds. 
 
Figure 1.   FY 2005 Budget Authority 
















Note:  The DOD total budget authority for FY 2005 was 
$402.6 billion. 
From personal experience, some taxpayers are already 
somewhat suspicious of what DOD does with such large 
apportionments, especially when selective issues are given 
significant scrutiny by media.  For example, the website 
http://www.whereisthemoney.org/ points out that money is 
being “frivolously” spent on "…$1.1 trillion in unsupported 
accounting entries” and this headline “GAO Report Points to 
Pentagon Waste” (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ 
articles/A36544-2005Jan25.html) shows that the DOD is 
closely scrutinized.  Therefore, one can see how the 
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American taxpayer grows skeptical with the government in 
general, and especially the Department of Defense, which 
has a never-ending list of critics lined up to probe for 
the newest scandal. 
Other stakeholders who might gain from improved 
efficiency by extending O&M appropriations to 24 months are 
the air wings, submarines, surface ships and other 
operational units.  Some of the items that O&M funds are 
used for are: air operations, ship steaming operations, 
mobilization forces, training, and administrative, etc. 
The units that perform each of these functions would 
benefit from having more time to obligate the same amount 
of appropriated funds to ensure that they are getting the 
most efficient use of funds and not just carrying out the 
“use it or lose it” mentality.  For example, in Reinventing 
Government, by Gaebler and Osbourne, “If they don’t spend 
their entire budget by the end of the fiscal year three 
things happen:  they lose the money they have saved; they 
get less next year; and the budget director scolds them for 
requesting to much last year.  Hence the time honored rush 
to spend all funds by the end of the fiscal year.” (Gaebler 
and Osbourne, 1993, page 3) 
From personal experience, having to obligate 
additional funds and having large sums of unobligated funds 
at the end of the fiscal year can put a significant amount 
of stress on personnel trying to obligate these funds and 
can even lessen the integrity of the financial system.  For 
example, most units are required to maintain a list of 
prioritized unfunded requirements with their type 
commanders.  However, when money arrives from a higher 
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echelon, instead of spending money in accordance with the 
prioritized list, items are funded in an order in which 
funds can be obligated the easiest to meet the time 
constraint.  For example, an interview conducted with an 
anonymous supply officer detailed how expiring funds were 
obligated quickly on lower priority items with National 
Stock Numbers (NSN).  During normal operations higher 
priority items, which needed a detailed contract processed 
through the Fleet Industrial Supply Center (FISC), would 
take precedence over lower priority items.  However, based 
on the limited available time to obligate the expiring 
funds, it was considered more essential to obligate these 
funds vice losing the money when the obligation authority 
expired.  This is also an example of “use it or lose it” or 
“hurry up spending” as known to Congress.   
In past fiscal years, additional funds would be 
parceled out to operational units from higher echelon 
commands just prior to 30 September. What happens next is 
what the general public would generalize as frivolous 
spending.  In an attempt to maintain an existing baseline 
funding amount for the following fiscal year, operational 
units and higher echelon commands will make a concerted 
effort to obligate 100% of their funding, thus using their 
funds instead of losing their obligation authority. 
As indicated by a GAO Report, (GAO Report, July 31, 
1998, page 2), which highlighted year-end spending; the 
Senate Subcommittee on Government Management held hearings 
and issued a report, Hurry-Up Spending, to address problems 
with federal spending practices and the award of government 
contracts. The Subcommittee found that the “rush to 
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obligate expiring funds at the end of the fiscal year 
…frequently resulted in a lack of competition, poorly 
defined statements of work, inadequately negotiated 
contracts, and the procurement of low-priority items or 
services.”   
The GAO report goes on to explain how wasteful year-
end spending can occur when agencies rush to use funds at 
the end of the fiscal year.  “This is often an attempt to 
spend funds that would otherwise expire, meaning they would 
no longer be available for new obligations after the fiscal 
year ends.  In its 1980 report, the Subcommittee recognized 
that higher fourth-quarter obligations may not indicate a 
problem with wasteful spending.  The Subcommittee noted 
that spending at year-end may be the result of legitimate, 
planned, and worthwhile spending intended by Congress.  
However, the Subcommittee found numerous examples in which 
agencies took shortcuts in the last few weeks of the fiscal 
year that led to questionable contracts.  Hurry-up 
procurement practices resulted in the purchase of millions 
of dollars worth of goods and services for which there were 
no demonstrated current needs.  The Subcommittee found that 
to spend quickly, the government frequently paid inflated 
prices, incurred higher administrative costs for overtime, 
and awarded contracts that were not in the government’s 
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III. DATA AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
This project uses data drawn from Mark Kozar’s thesis 
to indicate the dimensions of the rush to spend at the end 
of the fiscal year using data from the 1977-1990 time 
frame.  The statistical analysis of his 14 years of fiscal 
data pulled from DOD O&M accounts will establish the base 
for which conclusions will be drawn and recommendations 
determined. 
Mark Kozar studied O&M Total Obligation rates for a 
14-year period, from 1977 to 1990.  Table 1 data displays 
each month starting in October through September.  (Note:  
October is the start of the new fiscal year.  January, 
April, and July are the first months of each new quarter.) 
 
Table 1.   Average DOD Operations and Maintenance 
Monthly Obligation Rates with High-Low Ranges 
(Percent) 1977-1990 
 
    
Month DOD Average High Low
**October 11.235 12.3 9.83
November 8.018 9.73 7.03
December 7.346 8.18 6.47
*January 10.048 11.42 8.11
February 7.165 8.35 6.1
March 7.223 7.96 5.65
*April 9.083 10.61 8.3
May 6.708 7.61 6.09
June 6.726 7.49 5.89
*July 8.778 10.57 7.43
August 6.887 7.39 6.17
September 10.616 12.05 9.78
Total 99.833   
Source:  Kozar, 1993, pp. 132-133 
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Figure 2 graphically displays the averaged data from 
Table 1 by month. 
 
Figure 2.   DOD Monthly O&M Obligation Rates 
 
 
Source:  Kozar, 1993, pp. 132-133 
 
In general, the first and last months of the 
fiscal year are the highest spending months.  
October generally surges because of new contracts 
being let.  Traditionally, spending is low in the 
summer as year-end positioning takes place, and 
September is relatively high as managers rush to 
spend their funds on planned and unplanned needs.  
October shows the highest rate of commitment of 
funds (11.235%), and September illustrates the 
end-of-year spending surge.  September was the 
second highest individual month, and the rate of 




                     
4
 (10.616% - 6.887%)/6.887% = 53.6% increase in obligations 
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exceeded any other rate of change between two 
months.  The fact that August has a low 
obligation rate helps create this relationship. 
(Jones & McCaffery, 2004, page 216) 
 
The analyzed data above is typical of what you would 
see and expect from various units throughout DOD.  On 
average, September is well above the normal obligation 
rates as compared to the other quarter-ending months.  For 
example, as indicated in Table 1, the quarter-ending months 
December, March and June spent on average 7.098%5 of the 
total fiscal year budget.  This is significantly less when 
compared to September’s average of 10.616%, an increase of 
49.560%6 of the entire fiscal year budget.  What would be 
the effects if one-year appropriations were extended to 
twenty-four months?  Potentially, implementing this change 
would cause September to resemble the other end-of-quarter 
months and make it look less like an outlier. 
Additionally, when comparing September’s obligation 
rate with the other eleven months’ averaged obligation 
rates, September has an increase of 30.580%7.  However, the 
overall analysis of this collected data only reveals the 
quantity of purchases and not the quality. 
Table 1 reveals that the DOD, as an aggregate, 
obligates funds accurately, almost flawlessly.  The total 
DOD O&M obligation rates were 99.833%.  Stated another way, 
Congress has appropriated a certain amount of funding for 
                     
5
 (7.346%+7.223%+7.726%)/3 months = 7.098% average of quarter ending 
months 
6
 (10.616% - 7.098%)/7.098% = 49.560% increase in obligations 
7
 (10.616% - 89.384)/11 months = 10.616 – 8.126 = 2.49%/8.126% = 
30.640% increase in obligations in September. 
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O&M, and DOD has obligated that money within the 
constraints and within hundredths of one percent.  It 
appears as if DOD simply obligates funds because it is 
culturally acceptable to obligate all appropriated funds to 
zero.  While this may seem trivial, it raises some 
interesting questions.  At the end of fiscal year, does the 
DOD always obligate appropriated funds according to highest 
priority requirement?  Would DOD obligate funding on the 
same items that they currently do if there was a mechanism 
in place that would allow DOD to carry forward a maximum of 
20% from this fiscal year to the next? 
After conducting eight separate interviews with Naval 
Supply Corps Officers, the answer to both questions is 
“no”.  Additionally, all eight officers said that if they 
had had an incentive not to spend and had available to them 
the ability to roll excess funding forward to the next 
fiscal year, they would have been more critical with all 
these obligations. 
The Supply Officers surveyed were then asked, “If 
biennial appropriations were approved by Congress, would 
that action cause them to obligate funds more critically?”  
By definition biennial budgeting only changes the times on 
which the budget is voted on, which in this case is every 
two years.  Therefore, after learning the definition of the 
biennial budgeting, all answered that their obligations 
under this situation would not change because the resulting 
appropriation would mirror the present-day annual routine.   
Would a multi-year or a two-year appropriation provide 
logisticians the ability to obligate funds more critically?  
Their answers were that they would still be forced to 
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obligate to zero all appropriated funds every two years.  
This does nothing more then push the annual rush to spend 
out to two years from the current annual ritual to spend-
out to zero.  The proposal we present later in the project 
provides guidance to prevent the annual rush to spend.   
Although the interviewed officers agreed additional 
time to obligate expiring funds would be beneficial, there 
was an underlying concern that any change would evaporate 
these additional funds they receive annually.  Would Type 
Commanders hold most of these formally expiring funds for 
their centrally funded requirements?  Consensus is that 
although all expiring funds are not completely obligated 
towards the highest priority items they still fill a much 
needed funding void for ships to fill lower priority needs 
necessary to meet minimum daily requirements. 
Moreover, the current way things are done exacts a 
toll on personnel. Here is a list of dysfunctions which 
occur to normal operating patterns because of use it or 
lose it pressures: 
• Commanding Officers, who would normally be upset when 
sailors work late because of “quality of life” issues, 
do not second guess a decision to work late in order 
to obligate funding by midnight, 30 September. 
• Fleet Industrial Supply Centers (FISC) have 
historically worked extended hours during the last 
week of the fiscal year in order to provide service to 
the fleet.  
• Every contracting shop has stories about the end-of-
year contracting extravaganza and takes pride in being 
viewed as doing their part to support the fleet.  It 
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is a common philosophy for a contracting shop to 
perform in an exceptional manner that will prevent it 
from being responsible for causing a unit from 
obligating its full Operating Target (OPTAR) budget. 
So at the end of the fiscal year, most contracting 
personnel can expect to work many additional hours to 
provide service to the military units in order to 
obligate their expiring funds.   
• Comptrollers and military officers automatically 
assume that their personnel have bought into the 
paradigm of staying late and fully obligating their 
OPTAR.  Young, inexperienced, enlisted personnel are 
the only ones who question the paradigm of staying 
late the last few days of the fiscal year.  This 
question seems to raise eyebrows around the office and 
is almost laughable, but their minds are quickly 
changed.  By the next fiscal year, they are 
indoctrinated into the normal way the DOD “does 
business”. 
It seems as if obligating all their OPTAR on 30 
September provides them a sea story about the unforgettable 
spending spree, and it becomes a rite of passage, defining 
a way of life for all financial managers and their 
subordinates. 
Not only does the existing policy of “use it or lose 
it” generate a significant amount of perceived and real 
fiscal waste, but it also places undue stress on sailors, 
supervisors, and military family members.  With the 
increased deployment requirements being demanded from all 
military members, is it necessary to burden them with 
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additional time-consuming duties created from outdated 
appropriation policies and obligation mismanagement at many 
different levels? 
A. EXTENDING OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE APPROPRIATIONS 
VS. MULTI-YEAR AND BIENNIAL APPROPRIATIONS 
It is important to note that this is not a proposal to 
change one-year appropriations to two-year appropriations, 
nor is it a proposal to have biennial budgeting, but only a 
proposal to extend the obligation life of the 
appropriation.  A recent study, generally favorable towards 
biennial budgeting, concedes that biennial budgeting 
“entails some loss of…legislative control.” (Whalen, 1995-
1996, page 18)  This research effort views biennial 
budgeting unlike that of extending the single year 
appropriation.  Receiving Congressional support of a 
proposal to extend the obligation period vice changing it 
to a biennial budget is more likely because it still 
requires DOD to seek annual budget approval; thus 
maintaining existing Congressional control.  Additionally, 




























Our proposal centers on extending O&M one-year 
appropriations to 24 months with spending limits and 
requirements.  Congress would still be required to 
appropriate O&M money annually; however, the funds that are 
appropriated would increase its obligation life by 12 
months to a total of 24 months.  It is important to note 
that this is not a proposal to change one-year 
appropriations to two-year appropriations or biennial 
budgeting, but only a proposal to extend the obligation 
life of the appropriation.  A previously mentioned study, 
generally favorable towards biennial budgeting, concedes 
that biennial budgeting “entails some loss of…legislative 
control” because the legislature passes a budget every two 
years instead of one.  (Whalen, 1995-1996, page 18) 
Extending the obligation life would require financial 
personnel to track both the remaining 12 months of expiring 
fiscal year funding plus the full 24 months of the newly 
provided O&MN funding.  Although the tracking of old and 
new fiscal year funding at the same time would be new for 
most comptrollers it is normal practice for procurement and 
RDT&E comptrollers; thus, sharing of ideas, technology and 
lessons learned would be a requirement for a smooth 
transition.  Additionally, ships’ financial personnel 
currently track O&M funding for three years via Summary 
Filled Order/Expenditure Difference Listing (SFOEDL); 
therefore, the tracking of current year and prior years’ 
budgets would only add minimal additional oversight. 
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Our proposal would require financial managers to 
obligate, at a minimum, 80% of their total O&M funding in 
the first 12 months of the new appropriation.  
Congressional law currently requires financial managers to 
“monitor the twenty-two rule” which states that you are 
prohibited from obligating more than 20 percent of your 
budget authority in the last two months of the fiscal year.  
“This is a general provision of each Authorization Act.  
This rule is directed as a general provision in the DOD 
Appropriations Act and monitored by USD(C) at the 
appropriation level.  Obligations for the fourth quarter 
are not to exceed the obligations of the third quarter, and 
orders for supplies will be kept to essentials only-recall 
the bona fide needs rule for appropriations” (Candreva et 
al, 2004, page 119). 
Current obligation rates, (100% by the end of 12 
months) would be changed to reflect the minimum obligation 
requirements in Table 2 and 3.  The remaining 20% is spread 
out over the last 12 months and requires quarterly 
obligation thereafter of at least 5% until 100% is 
obligated.  At any time along the way if a unit is unable 
to justify why it is falling behind the obligation rates, 
then it would result in higher echelon reprogramming of 
excess funds. 
 
Table 2.   Required Obligation Rates for Extending to 



















Rate >= 80% >=85% >= 90% >= 95% 100% 
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As stated above the “twenty-two rule” is already in 
effect and would require Congressional effort to change the 
obligation percentages required by law.  The requirements 
for the rule would change and so should the name.  The 
recommended name change proposed would be the “80/20 Rule”.  
The spirit and intent of the law would be that 80% of the 
appropriated funds would be obligated in the first 12 
months and would therefore leave 20% to be obligated over 
the remaining 12 months as seen in Table 2 and Table 3. 
 
Table 3.   Proposed Total Obligation Rates by Fiscal 
Year 
Year 1 Year 2 Total Appropriated
2004 80% 20% 100%
Year 1 Year 2
2005 80% 20% 100%
Year 1 Year 2
2006 80% 20% 100%
Year 1 Year 2
2007 80% 20% 100%
Total Obligations 80% 100% 100% 100%
 
 
Note that in the transition year, (year 1) the 
obligation rate could be in the high 90’s.  The proposed 
change only requires that obligations must be at least 80%.  
These are minimum thresholds. 
 For those who feel our 80-20 rule is adding complexity 
to complexity, we suggest another alternative which is to 
simply create the O&M account like the existing RDT&E 
account and let the patterns which govern it, govern the 
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new two year O&M account. In 2003, the RDT&E account 
obligated 90.22 percent in year one and 9.78 percent in 
year two. This also would be a viable way to correct the 
end of year obligation surge with the added advantage of 
modeling on procedures already in place within DOD. 
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V. BUDGETARY ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES OF EXTENDING 
THE OBLIGATION PERIOD FROM ONE-YEAR APPROPRIATIONS 
TO 24 MONTHS 
A. CONTROL 
1. (DOD Advantage)  
Military/Civilian administrators would have more 
control over funding issues than current appropriation laws 
allow.  Our proposal of changing the appropriation law 
would allow financial managers the ability to obligate O&M 
funds over a 24 month window vice a 12 month window.  
Currently the budget is allocated for a particular 
fiscal year and the law prevents left over funds from being 
carried forward into another fiscal year.  Because the 
budget for the next fiscal year is based in part from the 
actual expenditure from the previous fiscal year there is 
no incentive to end the fiscal year with additional funds 
out of fear of a budget reduction.  As a result, during the 
financial year, budget personnel manage budgets carefully 
by scrutinizing all expenditures in the beginning out of 
concerns of exceeding budget authority.  As the fiscal year 
nears its end, there is pressure to obligate these 
accumulated funds at all costs.  The annual ritual begins 
when every divisional supply representative is briefed on 
what to expect, “have all your requirements in by this date 
so expiring funds can be quickly spent.”   
This proposal provides an additional 12 months to 
obligate expiring funds and provides financial managers the 
flexibility to closely scrutinize the obligation of funds 
towards items deemed a bona-fide need.  It is our thought 
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that removing the strict requirement of obligating 100% of 
O&M funding in 12 months will alleviate the lower priority 
end-of-year spending and the “use it or lose it” 
philosophy.  Possibly their could be an isolated case where 
financial managers could not meet the 80% obligation rule 
within the first 12 months, but the overwhelming majority 
could easily do so.  Additionally, having the new fiscal 
year funds arrive annually completely eliminates the need 
to hold expiring funds for unexpected contingencies.  
Additionally, an experienced financial manager knows to 
obligate these expiring funds before using any of the newly 
arriving funds; therefore, preventing a future budget 
crunch to spend expiring funds at each of the proposed 
deadlines. 
2. (DOD Advantage)  
Extending the obligation period to 24 months would 
provide more decision-making flexibility (or power) to 
those who need it most, operators in the field and the 
sailors onboard ships.  Today’s supply officers have a 
myriad of daily, difficult time-consuming problems, ranging 
from personnel issues to tracking depot level repairables 
(DLR) in addition to having to communicate daily with 
shore-based facilities for logistic support.  Comptrollers 
or supply officers with an extended obligation period for 
O&M funds would immediately notice the difference: 
• The increased obligation period would allow them to 
critically evaluate each requirement against a 
prioritized unfunded list.  Currently, this list is 
generated, routed through the chain of command and 
filed with the Type Commander.  Funds are not always 
spent in accordance with an approved requirements 
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list or in accordance with the highest priority 
needs, but instead funds are sometimes spent on 
lower priority items solely because the O&M funds 
can be obligated towards them the quickest. 
• Currently, under existing appropriation laws, units 
lose the ability to recapture and obligate funds 
from prior fiscal years.  For example, DLR charges 
at or near the end of the fiscal year represent 
funds lost due to the lengthy challenge process.  
Once the charge has been reversed and has been 
credited to the ships Operating Target, the 
obligation authority is lost because it is posted to 
the prior fiscal year.  Extending the appropriation 
period would give the unit the opportunity and 
flexibility to obligate these recovered funds for 
current fiscal year requirements.  Many of today’s 
high technological DLR’s are extremely expensive and 
can easily exceed several hundred thousand dollars 
for one circuit card in FY05 funds.    
3. (DOD Advantage)  
Operational units and organizations are often required 
to hold significant funds for potential contingency 
operations.  Under current law, when the end of the fiscal 
year nears, activities play an annual guessing game of 
deciding how much funding to hold and when is the best time 
to spend current year funding prior to the end of the 
fiscal year.  With an additional 12 months to obligate: 
• OPTAR holders have the ability to hold funds 
beyond the end of the fiscal year without the 
fear of losing the obligation authority. 
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• The added flexibility alleviates the concern of 
not being able to fund contingency operations if 
too much funding is obligated prior to the end of 
the fiscal year. 
• The added flexibility alleviates the loss of 
obligation authority when funds go unspent due to 
time constraints. 
• Additional obligation time allows units the 
opportunity to obligate recovered funds from 
carcass charges resulting from successfully 
challenged DLR’s.  
4. (DOD Advantage)  
Overspending is another problem that occurs with the 
frantic spending of expiring funds, and thus, increases the 
risk of Anti-Deficiency Act violations.  Currently, when 
additional apportioned funds are received from higher 
echelons near the end of the fiscal year, financial 
managers experience pressure of being “under the gun” to 
spend quickly just to obligate all funds, sometimes in less 
than 12 hours.  Extending the obligation period of O&M 
appropriations to 24 months would result in more time to 
strategically spend money on equipment and supplies that 
are bona fide needs and current-year use.   
5. (Congressional Advantage)  
Congressional leaders gain legitimate power from their 
ability to appropriate funding to whatever programs and 
constituents they decide.  They currently have dynamic 
fiscal authority in a way that they are able to indirectly 
control the President’s foreign policy (by way of 
appropriating O&M funds annually) and can indirectly 
establish the Pentagon priorities.  Extending one-year 
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appropriations to 24 months would be, in essence, Congress 
maintaining their control and power.  This is an opposite 
effect of what would happen if Congress adopted two-year 
appropriations or biennial budgeting.  This is because DOD 
would still be required to seek budgetary Congressional 
approval annually by way of appropriations law.   
B. INCENTIVES 
1. (DOD/Congressional Advantages)  
With the extension of appropriations to 24 months, 
financial managers would be allowed to carry money forward 
into the next fiscal year.  This is an incentive for them 
to save money for future needs and to obligate wisely at a 
controllable pace.  The current incentive is to spend funds 
quickly and obligate to 100% of the appropriation or risk 
receiving smaller apportionments in future fiscal years. 
2. (DOD Advantage)  
Currently, at the end of the fiscal year when spending 
waste occurs, goods which are labeled as “nice to have”, 
a.k.a. lower priority items, are routinely purchased mainly 
because obligation can occur quickly.  This is significant 
because an item that has a stock number or is available 
through a prime vendor can be obligated within minutes.  
However, higher priority items that require contracting 
assistance (outside of the command) can take days and 
sometimes weeks to obligate funding.  Because additional 
funding usually becomes available days before the 
appropriation expires, an air of urgency is present to 
spend 100% of available appropriated funds to prevent loss 
and thereby lowering the baseline.  An extension to 24-
month O&M appropriations will jeopardize the purchase of 
these “nice to have” items.  This is because the purchase 
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of these items will rise to the level of a higher priority 
item.  Most likely the unfunded requirements list will grow 
and only shorten when these lower priority items move 
higher up in priority.  The bottom-line on this advantage 
is that if there is an incentive (such as extending O&M 
appropriations to 24 months) to carry funds forward into 
the next fiscal year, the “nice to have” items will 
typically go unfunded, thereby improving the efficiency of 
the obligated DOD funding.   
C. PUBLIC PERCEPTION 
1. (DOD Advantage)  
The listed advantages so far have all been centered on 
the end user.  Through the use of rigid spending 
guidelines, higher echelons would require goals of specific 
obligation percentages be satisfied as opposed to our 
current spending rates of 100% in 12 months.  This would 
lead to better use of funds, and also improve the 
perception of the military as being good stewards of 
taxpayers’ money by eliminating the current end-of-fiscal 
year spending frenzy. 
2. (DOD Advantage)  
Total O&M appropriations from 1977 to 1990 showed a 
mean percentage increase of obligations from August to 
September of 49.560%8.  Was this notable increase due to the 
incompetence of the financial manager to spend all of his 
apportioned funds during the fiscal year, or was it proof 
he could spend funding efficiently towards bona fide needs?  
Public perception would probably err on the side of 
incompetence and say that it is another example of “use it 
or lose it” spending.  An extension to 24 months would 
                     
8
 (10.616% - 7.098%)/7.098% = 49.560% increase in obligations 
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encourage financial managers to use funding on items that 
are considered higher priority instead of having to choose 
to obligate the funding on lower priority goods due solely 
to time constraints. 
3. (DOD Advantage)  
Support personnel such as those working at the Fleet 
Industrial Supply Centers and the Defense Depots annually 
plan for the end-of-fiscal year spending.  Logistics, 
contracting, and warehousing experts routinely work long 
hours of overtime to support the military’s rush to 
obligate.  Extending the obligation period of O&M funds 
would help generate savings from less overtime worked.  
Further research is required to indicate the possible 
amount of savings generated from working less overtime. 
4. (DOD Disadvantage)  
Federal employees and contractors who depend on 
working the extended hours during end-of-fiscal year 
spending may perceive the fewer hours worked as a threat to 
their livelihood.  Initially, this could create a negative 
work environment until the new norm is established. 
5. (Congressional/DOD Advantage)  
The thesis written by Williams (W6166, p.3) states, 
“the intent of increased oversight and control is to ensure 
that the intent of Congress is carried out by the executive 
branch.”  However, this intent sometimes results in 
unintended consequences as noted by Williams, “the impact 
of congressional oversight and control, and the detail to 
which this oversight and control is exercised, appears to 
be counterproductive to the achievement of the ends desired 
by Congress, because the burden of excessive congressional 
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management often impedes the Navy acquisition and budget 
execution efficiency and effectiveness.” 
One critical requirement demanded from financial 
managers is their ability to operate in a manner that 
avoids negative public perception.  Anti-Deficiency Act 
violations are occurrences that lead to such negative 
public perception and heighten the perceived need for 
additional Congressional oversight.  Cheney noted (page v, 
C4145) “It is important that in our pursuit of scarce 
dollars, the people who provide us the money trust that we 
will be good stewards of the money.  Negative public and 
Congressional perceptions jeopardize Navy funding.  As 
responsible stewards of taxpayers’ money, we must strive to 
obtain the optimum use of our resources, within the limits 
of the law.  Congress implemented a series of laws designed 
to prevent government officials from spending the 
taxpayers’ money in a manner that Congress did not intend.  
Collectively, the laws are referred to as the Anti-
Deficiency Act.  Execution of the budget contrary to the 
Anti-Deficiency Act is a violation of federal law.  Each 
violation damages the public perception that the Navy is a 
good steward of the taxpayers’ dollar, which could 
influence the amount and the degree of Congressional 
control and oversight of future funding.” 
D. MORALE/TRAINING ADVANTAGE 
1. (DOD Advantage)  
Employee morale would most likely increase due to the 
elimination of long-hour days required to obligate end-of-
year funding.  Personnel who work for financial managers 
typically work until midnight frantically obligating funds 
on 30 September and many additional hours leading up to 
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fiscal year’s end.  A 24-month appropriation would 
alleviate the need for long hours leading up to this annual 
ritual.  Proper and sensible obligation of O&M funding 
within the 24-month goal would result in a normal work day 
for most logisticians, financial managers, accountants, 
contractors, and warehousing personnel.  Additionally, this 
proposal would reduce the variability currently experienced 
within the supply chain when large quantities of supplies 
are pushed through the system in October as a result of the 
September spending binge.  The quantity of material moved 
in October should mirror that of the other eleven months 
because of the 24-month appropriation. 
2. (DOD Disadvantage)  
Currently, the non-logistician personnel enjoy the 
Christmas-in-September spending atmosphere.  At no other 
time does the high level of obligation scrutiny go on 
vacation as it does now in late September.  One would be 
hard pressed to find favor for this proposal from anyone 
outside the realm of logistic and financial personnel.  
However, the impact on crew morale should be slight and 
actually gain support when confronted with the facts that 


























The direction provided by Admiral Vern Clark, Chief of 
Naval Operations (CNO) in “Sea Power 21”, indicates the 
need to resource tomorrow’s fleet.  “Among the critical 
challenges that we face today are finding and allocating 
resources to recapitalize the Navy.  We must replace Cold 
War-era systems with significantly more capable sensors, 
networks, weapons, and platforms if we are to increase our 
ability to deter and defeat enemies.” (Proceedings, 2002)  
He states our “Navy values operational excellence as its 
highest priority and the vast majority of our training is 
devoted to sharpening tactical skills.  However, it is also 
important that our leaders understand sound business 
practices so that we can provide the greatest return on the 
taxpayer’s investment.” (Proceedings, 2002) 
The analysis of reforming the O&M account to a 24 
month appropriation is straightforward and falls in line 
with what the CNO has directed above.  The authority to 
obligate funds an additional 12 months should reduce 
spending in September.  Adoption of this proposal should 
eliminate the annual, end-of-year, spend-out, “use it or 
lose it” phenomenon where real spending priorities are 
ignored in a rush to obligate all remaining funds.  This 
also would provide program managers and organizations the 
ability to execute budgets more efficiently with greater 
attention to overall DOD mission without the fear of losing 




provide for the efficient use of manpower, reduce overtime, 
improve morale and create a consistent way of doing 
business year round. 
Existing experience in handling multiple-year 
appropriations (such as procurement and RDTE) is currently 
available for assistance and will provide lessons learned.  
Currently there are a small percentage of financial 
professionals who maintain multi-year appropriations.  
Further study is needed to determine exactly how much, but 
indications are this change would lead to a larger 
percentage of financial personnel required to handle 
multiple-year appropriations.  However, in order to insure 
a smooth transition for them to handle multi-year 
appropriations it would be necessary to use these lessons 
learned and hold proper training as necessary. 
A. WHO HAS TO BE INVOLVED IN FINDING RESOLUTIONS TO THE 
STATED PROBLEM? 
The problems with finding resolutions to these 
existing financial barriers are many, but this one proposal 
could help transform the DOD.  Sometimes the right people 
are not always involved in finding a solution to a problem.  
Many solutions may be available, but if there is not anyone 
to champion the cause then the greatest initiative able to 
solve a problem is just an idea.  Therefore, in order for 
an idea such as this to be successful, cultural barriers 
and paradigms need to be shattered.  The necessary changes 
needed for difficult cultural shifts require significant 
involvement by people of influence, those who will guide 
and direct these potential improvements into 
implementation. 
 39
People in the field, who understand the problems and 
limitations of the current systems, must be forthcoming and 
willing to challenge the status quo and push forward 
alternatives and radically new ideas.  Those who understand 
the system best are the military and civilian comptrollers, 
and they can best logically present advanced ideas that can 
work most efficiently within the financial mechanisms.   
The idea of extending annual appropriations to 24 
months has wide-reaching appeal to financial managers.  
However, the financial managers require assistance from 
academia and students of government financial management to 
further this research on proposed ideas and possible 
solutions.  Many professors have personal contacts that can 
directly or indirectly apply pressure along with subject 
matter influence that will help “push the envelope” a 
little further along.  Proposals move forward when an 
institution such as the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in 
Monterey, California, decides to commit significant 
teaching time to revolutionary ways and ideas that lead to 
increased fiscal accountability and financial readiness.  
Additionally, professors at NPS have access to the Conrad 
Chair. 
The Conrad Chair was established in 1986 to foster a 
robust relationship between the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and 
Comptroller) (OASN (FM&C)) and the financial management 
program at the Naval Postgraduate School.  The objective is 
to enhance professional development opportunities for 
faculty and students, and conduct and direct research 
supportive of the OASN (FM&C) in areas of resource 
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management. The Conrad Chair is charged with enhancing the 
academic and practical capabilities of graduates to assume 
critical financial management positions in the Department 
of the Navy.  (http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2000/ 
b04192000_bt198-00.html)  The ASN FM&C then has a working 
relationship with SECNAV and SECDEF.  From within this 
level of DOD, political influences can be leveraged to seek 
change.  
In finding a resolution, Congress may be apprehensive 
about finding a solution that could potentially cause a 
loss of power.  Extending O&M appropriations from 12 to 24 
months could be viewed as significantly reducing Congress’ 
ability to maintain the “power of the purse.”  
Congressional members are obviously aware of this and would 
probably scoff at such proposals.  
However, an extension of obligation period to 24 
months allows Congress the ability to maintain its present 
“power of the purse” with the following caveats: 
• Annual appropriation bills would be approved as they 
are currently.   
• 80 percent of appropriations would be required to be 
obligated in the first 12 months. 
• The remaining 20 percent of appropriated funds could 
be obligated in the following 12 months (or the next 
fiscal year).  
Nevertheless, Congress realizes they have this power 
and will not relinquish it unless there is a more efficient 
alternative than the status quo.  Anything less would 
compromise their treasured authority and their “power of 
the purse”. 
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Additional issues requiring further investigation: 
• Determine if there is a way to quantify end-of-
year spending by the level of scrutiny received.  
Currently very little is applied due to the 
urgency to fully obligate all funds. 
• Determine if there is a way to measure the level 
of Congressional support for this proposal and 
the best way to package it for submission.   
• How can this issue be part of DOD’s bigger 
transformation plan that will move the military 
forward into the next century? 
The most significant impact of this proposal would 
occur within the program’s budgetary funding line.  The 
results will lead to improved efficiency with obligations 
and will most likely allow for some cost savings.  The 
President has suggested, the time has come… “to give DoD 
greater ability to shift funding from lower to high 
priorities during this period of increased military 
operations.  Also needed is to make O&M funds available for 
two years to help the department ensure, during budget 
execution, that funding goes to the military’s most 
pressing readiness, training and support requirements.”  
(http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?http:// 
www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040202-0301.html)   
Would a proposal like this result in decreased program 
line funding reductions or increased scrutiny from 
Congress?  One would caution against reductions because 
removal of the incentive to save would only push units of 
DOD to revert to the existing philosophy of “use it or lose 
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it”.  Any savings carried forward to the next fiscal year 
under this proposal resulted from sound business decisions 
and should not be used as indicators to reduce future 
funding. 
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